The policy of appeasement, pursued by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain between 1937 and 1939, remains one of the most debated subjects in twentieth‑century history. The central question is not whether appeasement was misguided, but how far it actively caused the war that began in September 1939. This essay argues that appeasement was a significant contributory factor, because it emboldened Hitler, weakened the collective security system, and delayed a firm British response until Germany had achieved a position of strength. However, appeasement alone cannot bear sole responsibility; deeper structural factors—Nazi ideology, the failure of the League of Nations, and the weakness of France and the USSR—were equally decisive. For A Level candidates seeking to structure such analysis, guides like Mastering the 5-Paragraph Essay offer practical frameworks for building balanced arguments.
The Rationale and Nature of Appeasement
Appeasement was not a policy born of cowardice but of perceived necessity. British leaders in the 1930s were haunted by the memory of the First World War, and public opinion was overwhelmingly pacifist. Military rearmament had been neglected; the Treasury, under Neville Chamberlain, feared that a rapid re‑armament programme would bankrupt the economy (Cairns, 1973). Furthermore, the British Empire was overstretched, and the Dominions were reluctant to support another European war. Chamberlain believed that by addressing Germany’s ‘legitimate’ grievances—such as the Treaty of Versailles’ territorial provisions—war could be avoided. This strategic calculation, however, rested on a fatal misreading of Adolf Hitler’s ambitions. As Kennedy (1980) argued, appeasement was a rational response to British weakness, but it ignored the ideological dynamism driving Nazi foreign policy.
How Appeasement Emboldened Hitler
The series of concessions between 1935 and 1939 provided clear evidence that the Western powers would not use force to uphold the Versailles settlement. The remilitarisation of the Rhineland in March 1936, undertaken in defiance of the Locarno Treaties, was Hitler’s first major gamble. The British government, preoccupied with the Abyssinian crisis, offered only verbal protests. Similarly, the Anschluss with Austria in March 1938 was accepted without any military response. The most damaging act of appeasement was the Munich Agreement of September 1938, which ceded the Sudetenland to Germany. Chamberlain returned to London proclaiming ‘peace for our time’, but Hitler interpreted the agreement as a signal of British weakness. As Watt (1989) demonstrated, Hitler concluded that Britain would never fight, a belief that encouraged him to press for the destruction of the rump Czechoslovak state in March 1939—a clear violation of the Munich pledge.
By the time Britain issued its guarantee to Poland in March 1939, the strategic balance had shifted decisively in Germany’s favour. The absorption of Czechoslovakia’s armaments industry and the Skoda works gave Hitler a material advantage he had not possessed two years earlier. Without appeasement, the war might have begun in 1938, when Germany was far less prepared for a major conflict (Weinberg, 1970). Thus, appeasement directly contributed to the timing and initial conditions of the war, making a German victory in the early campaigns more plausible.
The Counter‑Argument: Appeasement as Symptom, Not Cause
Some historians, most notably A.J.P. Taylor (1961), have argued that appeasement was essentially a pragmatic policy that made little difference to Hitler’s ultimate intentions. Taylor contended that Hitler was an opportunist who reacted to events rather than following a master plan. In this view, the Second World War was caused by the flawed peace settlement of 1919 and the failure of the great powers to construct a stable international order. Appeasement was merely a symptom of these deeper problems.
However, this interpretation underestimates the ideological core of Nazism. The Hossbach Memorandum of November 1937 recorded Hitler’s determination to achieve Lebensraum by 1943–45, irrespective of Western reactions. Overy (1995) demonstrated that Hitler actively sought war and used appeasement to gain time for rearmament. While appeasement did not cause Hitler’s aggression, it removed the constraints that might have prevented war from occurring at a time and place of Hitler’s choosing. Moreover, the policy undermined the credibility of France and Britain in the eyes of potential allies, such as the Soviet Union.
Other Contributory Factors
Appeasement cannot be isolated from other critical events. The Nazi‑Soviet Pact of August 1939 was a direct result of Stalin’s suspicion of the Western democracies—a suspicion partly founded on the Munich Agreement, which had excluded the USSR from European diplomacy. The failure of the League of Nations to enforce collective security, the isolationism of the United States, and the political instability of France all created a vacuum that Hitler exploited. As Steiner (2005) argued, the road to war was paved by multiple failures, not just British appeasement. Similarly, the policy of the British government toward Germany in the 1930s can be compared to the miscalculations that led to the First World War—an issue explored in How Far Was the Outbreak of the First World War in 1914 the Result of Miscalculation Rather Than Aggressive Intent?. Furthermore, Hitler’s consolidation of power within Germany after 1933 was achieved through a combination of legal and coercive means, as analysed in How Far Was Hitler’s Consolidation of Power in Germany Between 1933 and 1934 Achieved Through Legal Means?. Without this domestic consolidation, his aggressive foreign policy would not have been possible.
Conclusion
The policy of appeasement significantly contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War by providing Hitler with strategic advantages, encouraging his belief that Britain would not fight, and delaying effective opposition until Germany had armed to a high degree. Yet war did not occur because of appeasement alone. The underlying causes—Nazi ideology, the failure of collective security, and the weaknesses of the post‑Versailles order—created a combustible environment. Appeasement was the spark that helped accelerate the fire, but the fuel had been piling up for two decades. A balanced judgement must recognise that while appeasement made war more likely in the short term, it was not the sole, nor even the primary, cause. For students composing such nuanced evaluations, resources like Writing Effective Essays: A Guide To College‑Level Writing can help sharpen the critical thinking required for top grades.
Frequently Asked Questions
Q: What was the policy of appeasement?
A: Appeasement was a foreign policy strategy adopted by Britain and France in the 1930s that sought to avoid war by making concessions to the aggressive demands of Nazi Germany, most notably at the Munich Conference in 1938.
Q: Why did Britain pursue appeasement?
A: Britain pursued appeasement due to a combination of factors: the memory of the First World War, a lack of military preparedness, economic constraints, public pacifism, and a belief that Hitler’s grievances were partly legitimate.
Q: How did appeasement contribute to the outbreak of the Second World War?
A: Appeasement emboldened Hitler, encouraged him to believe that the Western powers would not fight, allowed Germany to absorb Austria and Czechoslovakia (including their resources), and delayed effective opposition until Germany was stronger.
Q: What arguments are made against the significance of appeasement?
A: Some historians argue that Hitler was determined to wage war anyway, that appeasement was a rational response to British weakness, and that the war was primarily caused by the flawed Treaty of Versailles and the failure of collective security.
Q: Is appeasement considered the main cause of WWII?
A: No, most historians see appeasement as an important contributory factor but not the sole cause. Nazi ideology, the failure of the League of Nations, the Nazi‑Soviet Pact, and the weaknesses of France and the USSR were also crucial.
References
Cairns, J. (1973) The Failure of the League of Nations. London: Macmillan.
Kennedy, P. (1980) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House.
Overy, R. (1995) Why the Allies Won. London: Pimlico.
Steiner, Z. (2005) The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919–1933. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Taylor, A.J.P. (1961) The Origins of the Second World War. London: Hamish Hamilton.
Watt, D.C. (1989) How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938–1939. London: Heinemann.
Weinberg, G. (1970) The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933–1936. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
